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Published Consentless Sexual Portrayals: A
Proposed Framework For Analysis
RUTH COLKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he question of whether society should regulate sexuai por-
trayals that are not "obscene" under the Miller standard' has
received considerable attention.2 Various strategies have been sug-
gested to strengthen the regulation of sexual portrayals. Each
strategy reflects the proponents' conception of the nature of the
harm occasioned by some of these portrayals-that they violate
women's civil rights,3 harm the moral fabric of society,4 or pose a
* Associate Professor, Tulane Law School; J.D. Harvard Law School 1981; A.B.
Harvard-Radcliffe College 1978. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mary
Whisner, Suzanne Stocking and John Stick whose conversations and editorial assistance
contributed to this Article. The author, of course, assumes responsibility for the ideas
expressed.
1. The current legal definition of pornography was set forth in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), in which the Supreme Court articulated the following three part stan-
dard for determining whether a work is obscene:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest
; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24. For further discussion of the traditional definition of pornography, see Jacobs,
Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 5, 25-29 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality: The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance,
2 LAW & INEQUALITY 629 (1984); Fahringer, Obscenity Law: Who Will Guard the Guards?,
TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 20; MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 321 (1984);
Stone, Obscenity Law Reform: Some Practical Problems, 130 NEW L.J. 872 (1980); Yaff&, The
Law Relating to Pornography: A Psychological Overview, 20 MED. SCL & L. 20 (1980); Com-
ment, Obscenity Law in Ohio, 13 AKRON L. REv. 520, 529 (1980); Note, Texas' New Obscenity
Laws: Redefining Taste, 17 Hous. L. REV. 835 (1980); Comment, Pennsylvania Obscenity Law:
A Pornographer's Delight, 41 U. PIrr. L. REv. 251 (1980). See also Jacobs, supra note 1, at 30-
36 (discussing commentators' and courts' responses to pornography).
3. Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, acting as consultants to the Minneapo-
lis City Attorney's Office, have drafted a municipal civil rights ordinance that would define
pornography as a form of sex discrimination. Their ordinance is premised on the finding
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special threat to children. 5 Little attention has been given, how-
ever, to another harm that flows from certain sexual portray-
als-a harm to the individual portrayed when that individual has
that "pornography is central in creating and maintaining the civil inequality of the sexes."
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., 7 CODE OF ORDINANCES § 139.10(a)(1) (1984), reprinted in 130 CONG.
RE . S13192 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) [hereinafter MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE]. The civil rights
focus of the ordinance is explicitly stated in the "special findings on pornography." Pro-
posed amendment to MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE, supra, reprinted in 130 CONG. REQ_ S13192-
93 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984).
The MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance defines four types of unlawful practices: (1) traf-
ficking in pornography; (2) coercion into pornographic performances; (3) forcing pornog-
raphy on a person; and (4) assault or physical attack due to pornography. Id. at § 4. It
generally creates a civil cause of action for any person aggrieved by violations of the ordi-
nance. The trafficking provision explicitly provides a cause of action for any woman, man,
child, or transsexual who alleges injury by pornography in the way women are injured by
it. Id. § 3(2).
The city-county council of Indianapolis and the surrounding county of Marion passed
an ordinance similar to the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance on July 11, 1984. INDIANAPOLIS
& MARION COUNTY, IND., CITY-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE No. 35 (1984) (amending INDI-
ANAPOLIS & MARION COUNTY, IND., CODE ch. 16, relating to human relations, equal opportu-
nity), reprinted in 130 CONG. REQ S13193-97 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984). Los Angeles County
has considered a similar ordinance. Proposed Los Angeles County Anti-Pornography Civil
Rights Law (copy available from author). The MacKinnon-Dworkin approach has received
ample criticism. The leading feminist organization to oppose the MacKinnon-Dworkin ap-
proach is the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT). More than 80 individuals,
most of whom are active feminists, signed a brief recently submitted by FACT in litigation
against the Indianapolis ordinance. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce for the American Booksellers Ass'n, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, No.
84-3147 (7th Cir. filed Apr. 8, 1985) [hereinafter FACT BRIEF]. See also Alter, Pornography
and Feminism: Divisive Relations Explored, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WOMEN, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at
12, col. 3; Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Pornography?, Ms., Apr. 1985,
at 37; The Minneapolis Anti-Pornography Ordinance, GUILD NOTES, Winter 1985, at 7; New
FACT Group Battles Censorship Law, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WOMEN, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 1, 13;
The War Against Pornography, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 58-66; Duggan, Censorship in the
Name of Feminism, The Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 11.
The only court to address the constitutionality of the MacKinnon-Dworkin approach
has found it to be unconstitutional. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp.
1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aif'd, 771 F.2d 323 (1985), affd mer., 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
4. See supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For further discussion of the
child pornography statute at issue in Ferber, see infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
A statute has been introduced on the federal level by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylva-
nia (S. 3063, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)). Senator Specter's bill would amend title 18 of
the United States Code to include a Child Protection Act to create remedies for children
and other victims of pornography. Although the statute is termed a "Child Protection
Act" it contains protection for any individual who has been coerced, intimidated or fraudu-
lently induced in engaging in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
any visual depiction of such conduct. See proposed § (c)(l). For further description of this
proposed statute, see 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REQ S13191-97 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1984) (statement of Sen. Specter).
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not consented to the portrayal. People mistakenly assume that this
problem does not exist or that these individuals already attain suf-
ficient relief under existing law.6
Individuals who are portrayed sexually without their consent
rarely prevail in actions to redress the injury stemming from these
portrayals.7 The individuals who have brought these actions can
6. See, e.g., FACT Brief, supra note 3, at 48-51. See also Transcript of Workshop, Por-
nography: A Feminist Legal Response, 16th Nat'l Conference on Women and the Law, in
New York City (Mar. 24, 1985) (available on cassette tape from the conference) (one mem-
ber of the audience who identified herself as a tort professor asked why existing tort law
would not assist victims of pornographic portrayals. One of the speakers at the workshop,
Nan Hunter, suggested in response to a similar question from the audience that existing
legal doctrine is sufficient to respond to victimization from pornography). For a proposed
statutory solution to this problem, see Colker, Legislative Remedies for Unauthorized Sexual
Portrayals: A Proposal, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 687 (1984-85).
7. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (female plaintiff having per-
sonal jurisdiction to bring libel suit against defendant); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745
F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing jury award of ten million dollars for female plaintiff
who was allegedly misidentified as the subject of nude magazine photographs), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2114 (1985); Faloona v. Hustler Mag., 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming
dismissal of invasion of privacy case stemming from publication of plaintiff's nude photo-
graphs in the Sex Atlas); Wood v. Hustler Mag., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming
damages for female plaintiff who was allegedly depicted nude in Hustler's "Beaver Hunt"
section without her consent), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985); Boddie v. ABC, 731 F.2d
333 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing lower court's dismissal of action brought under federal wire-
tap statute regarding information obtained about female plaintiff's sexual activity); Braun
v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.) (affirming female plaintiff's damage award in privacy ac-
tion concerning allegedly unauthorized publication of female plaintiff's photograph), cert.
denied sub nom., Chic Mag. v. Braun, 105 S. Ct. 252 (1984); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695
F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (reversing jury award on behalf of plaintiff and dismissing action
where magazine allegedly portrayed plaintiff as performing aberrant sexual acts with her
baton), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982)
(reversing and remanding summary motion for defendant in defamation action involving
defendant's alleged portrayal of plaintiff as a street prostitute), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040
(1983); Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant in libel action arising out of defendant's allegedly inaccurate portrayal of plain-
tiff as a whore), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Geisler v.
Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing dismissal of female plaintiff's action re-
lating to publication of story which allegedly depicted plaintiff as engaging in "untoward
sexual conduct"); Douglass v. Hustler Mag., 607 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (granting
defendant magazine's motion for new trial unless plaintiff agreed to remittitur of jury
award in action stemming from defendant's alleged publication of female plaintiffs photo-
graph without her consent), rev'd in part, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Play-
boy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss in
action brought by three minor male plaintiffs allegedly photographed while being assisted
by a female policewoman in fixing a bicycle. This photo was included in the publication of
a spread of nude photographs of the policewoman without the plaintiffs' consent); Parnell
v. Booth Newspapers, 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (denying defendant's motions
for dismissal and summary judgment where defendant allegedly published plaintiff's photo-
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be divided into five categories: (1) well-known nonpolitical individ-
graph in "false light" in connection with newspaper articles on prostitution); Barger v.
Playboy Enters., 564 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (granting defendant's summary judg-
ment motion in defamation action relating to publisher's allegedly inaccurate description
of female plaintiff as engaging in aberrant sexual behavior), affd, 732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984); Hamilton v. United Press Int'l, 9 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2453 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in ac-
tion brought by male plaintiff for story that allegedly incorrectly stated that he was married
to a woman who had been arrested for indecent exposure; denying motion for summary
judgment in action brought by wife of male plaintiff); Wynberg v. Nat'l Enquirer, 564 F.
Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in libel
action brought by male plaintiff arising from publication of information about a close per-
sonal relationship); McCabe v. Village Voice, 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment on libel and false light claims while denying
motion as to the publication of private facts claim in action brought by female plaintiff who
was allegedly depicted nude without her authorization); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publish-
ing, 544 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (reversing verdict that had been granted to plaintiff
in suit alleging invasion of privacy based on publication of nude photographs), rev'd sub
nom. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib., 745 F.2d 123 (1984); Clark v. Celeb. Publishing, 530 F.
Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding female plaintiff damages in action relating to alleg-
edly unauthorized publication of photographs of her on the cover of and in advertisements
for defendant's magazine); Miss America Pageant v. Penthouse, 524 F. Supp. 1280
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in libel action
brought by plaintiff pageant after magazine story depicting sexual behavior by contestants);
Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissing action
brought by female plaintiff for publication of her partially nude photograph allegedly with-
out her authorization); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (granting
motion to dismiss the claim of saleswomen who were allegedly depicted as prostitutes and
denying motion to dismiss claim of salesmen who were allegedly described as "faggots" and
"fairies"); Martin v. Penthouse, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2058 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (af-
firming summary judgment for defendant's invasion of privacy action challenging publica-
tion of photographs of plaintiffs at "exotic erotic ball"); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal.
App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983) (reversing jury award for plaintiff who had under-
gone gender "corrective" surgery); Herrell v. Twin Coast, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1216
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's complaint in action arising from a
story stating that male plaintiffs had been suspended from the police force for an alleged
sexual assault); Spradley v. Sutton, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1481 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1982) (grant-
ing defendant's motion for summary judgment in invasion of privacy action against televi-
sion station for defendant's allegedly unauthorized broadcast of male plaintiff partially
nude); Brooks v. Stone, 253 Ga. 565, 322 S.E.2d 728 (1984) (granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment in defamation action relating to allegedly sexually critical state-
ments about plaintiff); Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254
(1983) (dismissing female plaintiff's action relating to allegedly nonconsensual publication
of her photographs); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 100 A.D.2d 175, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426 (re-
versing dismissal of plaintiff's complaint where mother and child were photographed par-
tially nude for an advertisement), affid, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457
(1984); Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982) (dismissing
plaintiff's action arising from unauthorized publication of a fictional novel in which plain-
tiff was allegedly portrayed as a whore), affid, 60 N.Y.2d 916, 458 N.E.2d 1256, 470
N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981)
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uals, often models or actresses, who are portrayed sexually with-
out their consent;8 (2) private individuals who have information
about their sexual behavior or sexual victimization published in
news-related stories without their knowledge or consent;9 (3) pub-
lic or private figures who are portrayed in dramatic fictionaliza-
tions of their sexual behavior without their consent;10 (4) individu-
als who seek to enter the arena of political dialogue and face
sexual invectives about their gender;11 and (5) private individuals
who appear in advertisements in a sexually suggestive context
without their knowledge or consent. 2 In all but the fifth category,
these individuals have generally failed to prevail.1 Nevertheless,
(granting partial summary judgment on behalf of plaintiff where defendant allegedly pub-
lished female plaintiff's photograph without authorization); Giaimo v. Literary Guild, 79
A.D.2d 917, 434 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1981) (affirming defendant's motion for dismissal where
male and female plaintiffs' photograph was published without authorization in an advertise-
ment); Creel v. Crown Publishers, 115 A.D.2d 414, 496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1985) (dismissing
plaintiff's invasion of privacy action stemming from publication of plaintiff's nude photo-
graph in a guide to nude beaches); Moore v. Stonehill Communications, 7 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment where
defendant published an allegedly unauthorized sexual photograph of plaintiff in advertise-
ment for a book); Guccione v. Hustler, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981)
(affirming on the issue of liability but reversing and remanding on the issue of damages in
action by male plaintiff arising from publication of a magazine photograph depicting him
engaged in sexually aberrant activity); Miller v. Charleston Gazette, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2540 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1983) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in action
arising from allegedly depicting male plaintiff in a cartoon as a person who engaged in
deviant sexual activities); Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint in action relating to unauthorized publica-
tion of plaintiff's identity as a rape victim); Cape Publications v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing award for female plaintiff where her partially nude
photograph was allegedly published without authorization), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893
(1983). Cf. Schrottman v. Boston Globe, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1487 (Mass. Super. Ct.
1981) (granting plaintiffis motion for summary judgment in libel action arising from de-
fendant's alleged false attribution of the use of an offensive, racial epithet to plaintiff);
Arrington v. New York Times, 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941
(1982) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss in action arising from newspaper's unautho-
rized publication of plaintiff's photograph in article on the upward mobility of the black
middle class), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983). For further discussion of issues arising
from racial epithets, see Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 35-63.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 64-85.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 86-98.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 106-31.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 35-131.
Aside from three successful cases brought by women who were not public figures under
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this Article argues that most of the individuals falling within these
categories should prevail under existing law.
Part II of this Article argues that individuals must have the
right to consent to their published sexual portrayals in order to
avoid the psychological and pecuniary harms arising from the in-
accurate message that they have willingly consented to being de-
picted as sex objects.14 It posits that the right to consent to sexual
portrayals is an important aspect of individuals' fundamental
rights of privacy, free speech and sex-based civil rights.
Part III of this Article proposes a framework to balance the
full set of rights implicated by these cases. 15 Under this proposed
framework, courts would first determine whether the individual
portrayed had consented to the portrayal, and then determine
what fundamental interests are raised by the case. For example, if
a private individual were portrayed in a sexual context without
consent, he or she could invoke the rights of privacy, sex-based
civil rights, and free speech rights. By contrast, if the portrayal
were not sexual the individual would not be able to invoke sex-
based civil rights. The publisher, however, would be able to in-
voke free speech rights-the strength of which would be deter-
mined by the newsworthiness of the publication. In light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions, Roberts v. United States Jaycees,16
and American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut,17 the full set of
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1982) (discussed further infra notes 41-63 and
accompanying text), more than 90% of the women who brought the cases cited in supra
note 7 have not obtained favorable judgments. The three successful cases brought by
women under N.Y. Civ. RIGHts LAW §§ 50-51 are: Clark v. Celeb Publishing, 530 F. Supp.
979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 100 A.D.2d 175, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426, affd,
63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80
A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981). By contrast, relatively many men have obtained
favorable judgments both within and outside the jurisdiction of the New York statute. See,
e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Guccione v.
Hustler, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). See also Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F.
Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (obtaining a preliminary injunction to restrain publisher from
distributing all copies of its magazine in England and New York that contained the drawing
of a nude black man seated in the corner of a boxing ring with a caption describing him as
"the Greatest"); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (denying defend-
ant's motion to dismiss an action by male plaintiffs arising out of their depiction as "fag-
gots" and "fairies" by defendant).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 24-131.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 132-55.
16. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
17. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
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rights implicated by these types of cases could be further
recognized.
Part IV of this Article argues that the failure to consider the
full set of rights implicated by these cases has led the courts to
misapply existing legal doctrine.18 The courts have misapplied the
actual malice standard, 19 the limited purpose public figure doc-
trine,20 and the standard of protection for news stories.21 Addi-
tionally, the courts have misinterpreted the recognizability re-
quirement for fictional portrayals, 22 and have failed to protect
individuals from sex-based group vilification.2 3 Under the frame-
work proposed in this Article, these doctrines would not be deter-
minative in cases involving consentless sexual portrayals.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. The Harm
The category of consentless sexual portrayals overlaps with
the traditional category of pornography.2' Some sexual portrayals
that are generally understood to be pornography are produced
without the consent of the individual portrayed.2 5 Other sexual
portrayals, such as many of the examples to be discussed in this
Article,26 are not commonly understood to be pornography but
are also produced without the consent of the individual por-
trayed. A cause of action is needed for victims of published con-
sentless sexual portrayals irrespective of whether the portrayals fit
the traditional definition of pornography. Consentless sexual por-
trayals are usually harmful to the individual portrayed and are
18. See infra text accompanying notes 156-210.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 37-50.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 51-63.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 64-85.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 86-98.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
24. See supra note 1.
25. For example, Linda Lovelace, the woman portrayed in the movie, Deep Throat, has
alleged that she was portrayed without her consent. See L. LoVELACE, ORDEAL (1980). Some
jurisdictions may consider this movie to be obscene under the Miller standard. See People v.
Mature Enters., 73 Misc. 2d 749, 343 N.Y.S.2d 911.(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff allegedly depicted
in film footage as prostitute while walking down the street fully clothed), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1040 (1983).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 64-131.
1986]
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often created in a context where the individual portrayed and the
publisher had unequal bargaining power."
Consentless sexual portrayals invoke the message that the in-
dividual portrayed willingly consented to be portrayed sexually in
a public setting. Because of the prevalent sexist stereotype that
"women are natural sexual prey to men and love it,"2 9 this mes-
sage is especially harmful to women who have not consented to
sexual portrayals. It "strips women of their autonomy, dignity,
and sexual potential"30 by contributing to a climate in which
women's lack of control over their sexual integrity is considered
acceptable.3 1
28. For a discussion of the link between sexual portrayals and patriarchy, see K.
BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979) (providing a historical and sociological discussion of
coercion against women to perform sexual acts); A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESS-
ING WOMEN (1981) (providing theoretical discussion of the link between pornography and
the oppression of women by men); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (L.
Lederer ed. 1982) (containing a collection of essays providing a feminist critique of por-
nography); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7
SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 515 (1982) [hereinafter SIGNS I]; MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method, & the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. oF WOMEN IN
CULTURE & SoC'Y 635 (1983) [herinafter SIGNS II] (providing theoretical discussion of
women's treatment under the law). For a discussion of the link between consentless sexual
portrayals and the development of modern technology, see Warren and Brandeis, infra
note 34.
Sexual portrayals become particularly alluring or profitable when the woman portrayed
has not consented. For example, the recent Penthouse Magazine publication of Vanessa Wil-
liams' photographs netted records for both amount of revenue received and number of
copies sold. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88. See generally K. BARRY, supra; S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1977); A. DWORKIN, supra; C.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
(1979); K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLrrTcs (1969); F. RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE
OF CHILDREN (1980); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT, Supra.
29. A. RICH, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in WOMEN, SEX AND SEXU-
ALrrY 62, 72 (C. Stimpson & E. Person eds. 1980).
30. Id.
31. The injury is characterized in this Article as a violation of a woman's sex-based
civil rights; the woman is only portrayed sexually because she is a woman, i.e., a man is less
likely to be portrayed as a sex object. Catharine MacKinnon more fully explains the signifi-
cance of an action against a woman "because she is a woman."
The substantive principle governing the authentic politics of women's personal
lives is pervasive powerlessness to men, expressed and reconstituted daily as sex-
uality. To say that the personal is political means that gender as a division of
power is discoverable and verifiable through women's intimate experience of
sexual objectification, which is definitive of and synonymous with women's lives
as gender female.
MacKinnon, SIGNS I, supra note 28, at 535. For a further discussion of the sex-based nature
of pornographic portrayals, see Lorde, Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power, in SISTER OUT-
1986] CONSENTLESS SEXUAL PORTRAYALS
As with the related problem of the publication of unwelcome,
intentional racial invectives, the individuals portrayed in unwel-
come and often derogatory sexual contexts need legal protection.
In the words of Richard Delgado, who has studied the problem of
racial invectives:
Victims of racial invective have few means of coping with the harms caused
by the insults. Physical attacks are of course forbidden. "More speech" fre-
quently is useless because it may provoke only further abuse or because the
insulter is in a position of authority over the victim. Complaints to civil
rights organizations also are meaningless unless they are followed by action
to punish the offender. Adoption of a "they're well meaning but ignorant"
attitude is another impotent response in light of the insidious psychological
harms of racial slurs. When victimized by racist language, victims must be
able to threaten and institute legal action, thereby relieving the sense of
helplessness that leads to psychological harm and communicating to the per-
petrator and to society that such abuse will not be tolerated, either by its
victims or by the courts.32
Similarly, victims of consentless sexual portrayals need effective
remedies to relieve their sense of helplessness as powerless sex ob-
jects, as well as to recover for any pecuniary damage to their repu-
tations or careers.33
siDER 53-59 (1984). See also Kittay, Pornography and the Erotics of Domination, in BEYOND
DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECrIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 145-74 (C. Gould ed. 1983)
(defining pornography by reference to the "actual or intimated sexual illegitimacy" of the
portrayal). According to Lorde:
The erotic has often been misnamed by men and used against women. It has
been made into the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized sensa-
tion. For this reason, we have often turned away from the exploration and con-
sideration of the erotic as a source of power and information. But pornography
is a direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it represents the suppression of
true feeling. Pornography emphasizes sensation without feeling. The very word
erotic comes from the Greek word eros, the personification of love in all its as-
pects - born of Chaos, and personifying creative power and harmony. When I
speak of the erotic, then, I speak of it as an assertion of the lifeforce of women;
of that creative energy empowered, the knowledge and use of which we are
now reclaiming in our language, our history, our dancing, our loving, our work,
our lives. There are frequent attempts to equate pornography and eroticism,
two diametrically opposed uses of the sexual.
Lorde, supra, at 54-55.
32. Delgado, supra note 7, at 146-47.
33. This author recognizes that the ability to consent is a necessary, although not suffi-
cient, indicator of sexual freedom. Other indicators of sexual freedom include considera-
tion of the other employment options available to the individual portrayed, the size of the
monetary compensation given to the individual for participating in the portrayal, or evi-
dence of threats made against the individual for failing to participate in the portrayal. For
a further discussion of the courts' treatment of the consent issue when women are par-
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B. Lack of Relief Under Existing Law
Under existing law, individuals who are victims of consentless
sexual portrayals rarely prevail. One of their few options is to
bring an action for invasion of privacy. 4 This approach is rarely
successful, as can be seen by examining the results in five catego-
ries of cases.
1. Well-Known, Non-Political Individuals. The first category
includes well-known, non-political individuals who have had their
reputations damaged by consentless sexual portrayals which went
beyond the boundaries of what they considered acceptable. 5
Their actions to recover damages for such portrayals are gener-
ally unsuccessful.3
Two cases challenging the conduct of Celebrity Skin magazine
reflect the difficulties that well-known individuals encounter when
they bring actions against publishers. Celebrity Skin prides itself
trayed sexually, see Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Development of a Group-
Based Theory for Sex-Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1 LAw & INEQUALITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY
& PRACTICE 191, 214-22 (1983).
34. See cases cited supra note 7. Invasion of privacy actions can be brought under four
related theories: (1) for appropriation of a plaintiff's name or likeness for a defendant's
benefit or advantage; (2) for intrusions upon a plaintiff's physicial solitude or seclusion; (3)
for public disclosure of private facts about a plaintiff; or (4) for publicity which places plain-
tiff in a false light in the public eye. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802-14
(4th ed. 1971). The four causes of action differ considerably:
[T]he first and second require the invasion of something secret, secluded or
private pertaining to the plaintiff; the third and fourth do not. The second and
third depend upon publicity, which the first does not, nor does the fourth, al-
though it usually involves it. The third requires falsity or fiction; the other
three do not. The fourth involves a use for the defendant's advantage, which is
not true of the rest.
Id. at 814.
Modern privacy doctrine derives from Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' pioneering
work, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) which expanded a property.based
privacy doctrine into a person-based doctrine. Until the late nineteenth century there was
no perceived need to develop legal protections against consentless sexual portrayals. The
rise of modern technology inspired the need for a person-based cause of action for invasion
of privacy. Id. at 196. During the last eighty years, legislatures have codified and courts
have interpreted Warren's and Brandeis' conception of the right to privacy under the four
distinct types of actions outlined above. For a historical discussion of the invasion of pri-
vacy doctrine, see Colker, supra note 33, at 201-05.
35. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Dist. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Ann-Margret v.
High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., 90 A.D.2d
374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982).
36. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 35.
37. See Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401 .(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Davis v.
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on "printing photographs of well-known women caught in the
most revealing positions that [it is] able to obtain."38 An actress 9
and a professional boxer" brought legal actions against Celebrity
Skin under a New York civil rights statute4 that provides a cause
of action for injunctive relief and damages when a person's name,
portrait, or picture is used, without that person's consent, for ad-
vertising purposes or for purposes of trade.
a. Ann-Margret. Ann-Margret, the actress, brought the first
action against the magazine. 2 In 1978, she allowed a filmmaker to
film her partially dressed during the production of one scene of a
movie. It was the second time in her career that she had been
filmed unclothed from the waist up. As a condition of the filming,
she only permitted essential personnel to be present and insisted
High Soc'y Mag., 90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982).
38. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
39. See id.
40. See Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., 90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982).
41. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1982):
Section 50. Right of Privacy
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 51. Action for Injunction and for Damages
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for adver-
tising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name,
portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue
and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use, and if the
defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in
such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the
jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages, But nothing contained in
this act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation,
practicing the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about his or its
establishment, specimens of the work of such establishment, unless the same is
continued by such person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting
thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing contained in this
act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation from
using the name, portrait or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in connection
with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by
him which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used
in connection therewith; or from using the name, portrait or picture of any
author, composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical or artistic
production which he has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture
used in connection therewith.
42. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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that the least possible amount of footage be taken."3 She at-
tempted to control both the content and the context of the
filming.
Without the knowledge or consent of Ann-Margret, Celebrity
Skin obtained a copy of the film and reproduced four pages of
photographs of her, including one photograph in which one of
her breasts was visible." Ann-Margret brought suit against the
publisher claiming violation of her right to privacy and publicity
under section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Statute. 5
The district court recognized that a literal interpretation of
the statute required a holding in favor of Ann-Margret because
the magazine made no attempt to acquire her consent,46 as re-
quired by the New York statute. Nevertheless, relying on Time,
Inc. v. Hill,48 the court ruled against Ann-Margret for two reasons.
43. Id. at 403 n.2.
44. These photographs appeared in the first edition of Celebrity Skin which was subti-
tled "Special Collector's Edition No. 1." Id. at 404.
45. She alleged that the one photograph of her posing partially nude violated her
right to privacy and that the publication of all of the pictures violated her right of public-
ity. The first allegation was made under sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Statute; the second allegation was made under the common law. Id. at 404-06. This Article
will not discuss her right to publicity claim. She lost that claim because:
[i]t is well established that simple use in a magazine that is published and sold
for profit does not constitute a use for advertising or trade sufficient to make
out an actionable claim, even if its "manner of use and placement was designed
to sell the article so that it might be paid for and read."
Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 404.
47. Id. at 403-04. Nevertheless, the court also seemed to be using an implied consent
theory, because Ann-Margret had consented to appearing in the original film.
The plaintiff in the instant action chose to appear partially nude during one
scene in a major motion picture which she knew was to be widely distributed.
Upon release, that film, which was highly successful, was seen by millions of
persons. It has been held that when an individual consents to be viewed in a
certain manner during the course of a public performance, such as in a movie,
it cannot then be argued that a subsequent faithful reproduction (no allegation
has been made that the picture has been altered) of that appearance constitutes
an invasion of privacy .... [H]aving consented to the exhibition there is no
invasion of privacy because [it is] not shown to the audience contracted for.
Id. at 405 (footnotes and citations omitted).
48. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Supreme Court was faced with the
question of whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury
that a verdict of liability under the New York statute could be predicated only on a finding
of knowing or reckless falsity (i.e., actual malice) in the publication of a newsworthy article
in Life Magazine. Additionally, the Court had to determine whether the New York statute
should be declared unconstitutional for failing to require proof of knowing or reckless
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First, the court held that it was required to apply the stringent
standards that had developed for public figures under defamation
law.49 Second, it found that the New York statute did not provide
the plaintiff with the right to consent to each context in which she
was portrayed. 50
b. Cathy Davis. The second case against Celebrity Skin in-
volved Cathy Davis. Davis was the first woman to become a profes-
sional, licensed boxer.51 The magazine published photographs of
two female boxers. 52 One picture portrayed two female boxers
unclothed from the waist up. To the left of the photograph, in
bold print, was the name "Cat Davis," with the following
statement:
Her vital statistics are: 35-25-35, 16 fights and 15 k.o.'s. Pound for pound,
the 132 lb beauty is one of the best female boxers in the ring today. Al-
though her manager/husband Sal Algieri claims she's never posed nude, this
photo sent in by a reader sure looks like the Top Cat to us.5 '
Davis brought an action for damages under sections 50 and
51 of the New York Civil Rights Statute,54 and introduced unre-
futed evidence that she was not one of the persons in the photo-
graph. 55 The state trial court held for Davis on her motion for
summary judgment because the defendants had neither disputed
falsity. The Supreme Court found that the trial court committed reversible error but
found the statute to be constitutional because "the New York Court of Appeals . . . has
been assiduous in construing the statute to avoid invasion of the constitutional protections
of speech and press." Id. at 397. In citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, the trial court implicitly
adopted the "knowing or reckless falsity" or "actual malice" standard for evaluating
whether Ann-Margret's privacy had been invaded.
49. As a public figure, the court held, Ann-Margret had no right to challenge a faith-
ful reproduction of her appearance because such a reproduction was a newsworthy item
that deserved first amendment protection. "The press may at times be trivial, and even
obnoxious, but this must be tolerated because of the important part it plays in protecting
our liberty." Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405-06 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
51. Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., 90 A.D.2d 374, 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (1982).
52. Id. at 375, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
53. Id. at 375, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 311, (appearing on page 84 of the third edition of
Celebrity Skin).
54. She also brought an action alleging a violation of her "right to publicity" under
the common law. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 310. Because the lower court
had granted summary judgment to plaintiff solely on the basis of her claims under the New
York statute, the court of appeals did not address the merits of her right to publicity claim.
See id. at 377 n.1, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 312 n.1.
55. Id. at 376-77, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
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that the photographs were of Davis nor that there was a lack of
consent.56 Since the New York statute required written consent, 7
the lower court found the lack of consent dispositive.
The state court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to
the trial court without challenging any of the factual findings un-
derlying the trial court's decision.58 It agreed that the magazine
specialized in publishing sexually revealing photographs of well-
known women, that the published photograph was identified as
depicting Davis, and that the publication was made without her
written consent. The court of appeals reversed because the trial
court had not made findings on the factual issue of "actual
malice." 9
Although the New York statute did not require that the ac-
tual malice standard be applied to public figures,. the Davis court,
relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill, found that first amendment consider-
ations required using the actual malice standard in cases involving
public figures.60 Because the "actual malice" is a factual issue, the
case had to be remanded to the trial court for a factual finding.
1
According to the court of appeals, defendants' allegations that the
photograph did not depict Davis and that the photographer had
proven reliable in the past were sufficient, as a matter of law, to
survive Davis' summary judgment motion.62 Defendants were not
required to allege evidence of having obtained Davis' consent to
survive the summary judgment motion, despite the language of
the New York statute.6
3
2. Private Individuals Portrayed in Newsstories. The second
category encompasses private individuals who have had informa-
tion about their sexual behavior or sexual victimization published
in news-related stories without their knowledge and consent and
56. Id.
57. Id. at 376-77, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 311-12.
58. Id. at 376-77, 457 N.Y.S. 2d at 312.
59. Id. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a de-
tailed discussion of defamation law and the actual malice standard as they relate to
women's sex-based discrimination for invasions of privacy, see Colker, supra note 33, espe-
cially at 210-13.
60. Davis, 90 A.D.2d at 382-84, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 315-16.
61. Id. at 383, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
62. Id. at 384, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
63. Id. at 382-83, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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who have suffered emotional distress from such publications.6 4
Both men and women have challenged their sexual portrayals in
news stories on the basis that the portrayals were inaccurate or
not of public interest.6 5 They have rarely won.6
a. Ruby Clark. For example, on April 22, 1977, American
Broadcasting Corporation ("ABC") aired a special television
broadcast entitled, "Sex for Sale," that described the problem of
prostitution in America's cities and suburbs.67 One segment of the
broadcast showed Ruby Clark walking down the street in a mid-
dle-class neighborhood. The context suggested that Clark was a
prostitute.6 8 ABC had filmed Clark without her knowledge or
consent.
Clark brought an action against ABC claiming defamation
64. See Cape Publications v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (female
plaintiff's privacy not invaded by newspaper publication showing her partially nude and
emotionally distressed during police rescue), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Spradley v.
Sutton, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1481 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1982) (male plaintiff's privacy not in-
vaded despite a television station broadcast of film showing surrender and arrest of plain-
tiff, who had allegedly shot police officer and held young boy hostage, and who was dressed
in underwear at the time of his arrest). Cf. Arrington v. New York Times, 55 N.Y.2d 433,
434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1982) (black male plaintiff's allegations under sec-
tions 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law that photographer and photographic
agency violated the statute by taking his photograph and selling it without his consent to
illustrate an article on the upward mobility of the black middle class were sufficient to
withstand defendants' motion to dismiss; however, plaintiff's allegations were not sufficient
to give rise to cause of action for false light invasion of privacy), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146
(1983).
65. See supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. See Clark v. ABC, 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040
(1983).
68. Soon after Clark was pictured, a female resident of the neighborhood stated in the
broadcast that, "[a]lmost any woman who was black and on the street was considered to be
a prostitute herself. And was treated like a prostitute." Id. at 1211.
During and following the broadcast, several acquaintances and relatives phoned Clark
to say that they thought she was portrayed as a prostitute. Afterwards, employers refused
her employment because they feared that hiring her would hurt their business. She was
also shunned and propositioned. Id.
Clark had not consented to the portrayal and was not aware that she was being filmed.
ABC had no reason to believe that she was a prostitute. Clark's portrayal was simply con-
venient to the story line-she was young, stylishly dressed, female and black, fitting into
one stereotype of a prostitute. For a discussion of women's special victimization by pornog-
raphy, see generally A. DWORKIN, supra note 28 at 129-98; Gardner, Racism in Pornography in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 105 (L. Lederer ed. 1980). Walker, Coming Apart, in TAKE BACK THE
NIGHT 95 (L. Lederer ed. 1980). But see Bulkin, Hard Ground: Jewish Identity, Racism and
Anti-Semitism in YoUris IN SRmUGGLE 89, especially at 129-30 (1984) (criticising Dworkin's
approach to racial sexual issues).
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and invasion of privacy.69 The district court granted ABC's mo-
tion for summary judgment and found that the broadcast was not
libelous as matter of law.70 The court of appeals reversed. 1 It
held that the district court should have granted summary judg-
ment for ABC only if the broadcast was not reasonably capable of
a defamatory meaning.7 2 The court of appeals found that the
broadcast was capable of having either a defamatory or non-de-
famatory meaning, depending upon whether an observer would
conclude that the broadcast depicted Clark as a prostitute.7 3 This
factual issue was for the jury to decide.7 Thus, six years after the
original broadcast,75 Clark won the right to have a jury decide
whether she was defamed by the broadcast.
b. Jane Doe. In cases where a woman's sexuality has been
accurately, although nonconsensually portrayed in news-related
stories, the individual has had less success than Clark, even though
courts have reprimanded the media for failing to serve the public
interest.7 6 Jane Doe, for example, agreed to testify against her al-
leged rapist at a criminal trial under the assurance that her name
and photograph would not be published or displayed. 7 She testi-
fied, and Sarasota-Brandenton Television aired the testimony dur-
ing the evening news. It also identified Jane Doe by name to the
viewing audience.7
Relying on a Florida statute that prohibited publication of in-
formation identifying sexual offense victims, 79 Doe brought an ac-
69. Clark initiated an action in Wayne County Circuit Court against ABC alleging def-
amation and invasion of privacy. She claimed that the Broadcast depicted her as a "com-
mon street prostitute." ABC removed the case to a federal district court pursuant to the
court's diversity jurisdiction. Clark, 684 F.2d at 1211.
70. Id. at 1212.
71. Id. at 1210.
72. Id. at 1213.
73. Id. at 1213-14.
74. The court accepted ABC's argument that courts must be cautious in allowingju-
ries to decide defamation cases which involve public interest reporting. Id. By ruling in
favor of ABC on the summary judgment motion it did not have to send the matter to the
jury.
75. ABC appealed the court of appeals' decision to the Supreme Court which denied
the request for review in 1983. Clark v. ABC, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983).
76. See Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
77. Id. at 329.
78. Id.
79. The text of the Florida statute is as follows:
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tion for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Sarasota-Bradenton Television. 0 The court dis-
missed the complaint, citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,"x a Su-
preme Court decision that precludes a state from punishing a re-
porter for accurately publishing information obtained at a judicial
proceeding.8 2 It was undisputed that the information reported
about Doe was accurate. Nevertheless, the Doe court ended its
opinion by chastising the state for its actions, stating:
[W]e cannot resist the opportunity to chastise the state somewhat for not
having sought a protective order regarding cameras in the courtroom or
other proper steps to support its alleged assurance to appellant that her
name and photograph would not be published. 3
Although the court thought that the news media "could well as-
sume no responsibility not to publish the video tape,"" it did note
that "in the future it would behoove the media to engage in their
own balancing test with an eye to avoiding such harm as may have
occurred here." 85
3. Portrayals in Fiction. The third category comprises pub-
lic and private figures who have experienced emotional distress
from dramatic fictionalizations of their sexual behavior, because
of their inability to limit recognizable descriptions of themselves.8
Section 794.03.
Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense vic-
tim. No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be
printed, published or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the
name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any
sexual offense within this chapter....
Id. at 329 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1981)).
80. Doe filed a four-count complaint against Sarasota-Bradenton Television Company:
(1) seeking a declaration that she was a member of the class protected by the Florida stat-
ute, (2) seeking damages for violation of the statute, (3) seeking damages for intentional
invasion of privacy, and (4) seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 329.
81. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
82. Id. at 489-96.
83. Sarasota-Bradenton Television, 436 So. 2d at 331.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 332.
86. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (article describing
physically impossible act in impossible setting a fantasy and cannot be seen as describing
plaintiff), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 457
N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982) (female plaintiff's allegation that her former boyfriend's published
novel contained a character who resembled her as a prostitute who engages in unorthodox
sexual activities was insufficient to withstand defendant's motion to dismiss both her libel
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Fictional portrayals of public or private persons receive strong
first amendment protection from the courts, even when a plaintiff
argues that the piece of fiction portrays her recognizably in a de-
rogatory sexual context.8 7 The underlying theory is that fiction
rarely permits identification of a real person. 88
Pring v. Penthouse International"" is illustrative of the judicial
protection of public figures who are portrayed in fiction. Kimerli
Jayne Pring had participated in a Miss America contest as Miss
Wyoming. One of her talent acts was baton twirling.90 Penthouse
magazine published a piece of fiction that described a woman
named "Charlene" who was Miss Wyoming in a Miss America
contest and performed baton twirling. She performed various acts
of fellatio with her baton and later with her coach, that caused
him to levitate. Both acts were performed in the presence of a
national television audience at the Miss America Pageant."1
Pring brought an action for defamation against the magazine
and the author of the article. The trial court submitted to the jury
the question of whether the story could be reasonably understood
to refer to the plaintiff.92 The jury found that the plaintiff was the
person "referred to" and awarded her more than $14 million in
damages. 3
The court of appeals reversed." It found that the "reasona-
bly understood" test should not have been submitted to the jury
because the story was "fantasy" rather than "fiction" or "fact."95
According to the court, "[t]he charged portions of the story de-
scribed something physically impossible in an impossible setting
action and one brought under New York Civil Rights Law, sections 50-51), afj'd, 60
N.Y.2d 916, 458 N.E.2d 1256, 470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983).
87. See cases cited supra note 86.
88. Pring, 695 F.2d at 442. But see Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155
Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (applying test to determine whether plaintiff is identifiable in work of
fiction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
89. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
90. Id. at 440-41.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 442.
93. She was awarded $1.5 million in actual damages and $12.5 million in punitive
damages against the magazine, and $10,000 in actual and $25,000 in punitive damages
against the author. The defendants appealed to the Tenth Circuit which remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to set aside the jury verdict and dismiss the
action. Id. at 443.
94. Id. at 442-43.
95. Id. at 443.
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...it is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not have
understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and noth-
ing else."96 The court found that if fiction is so embellished so as
to be considered fantasy, a court, as a matter of law, can find that
a plaintiff was not recognizable.9 7
The Pring court of appeals did express some sympathy for the
plaintiff, however, stating: "although a story may be repugnant in
the extreme to an ordinary reader, and we have encountered no
difficulty in placing this story in such a category, the typical stan-
dards and doctrines under the first amendment must nevertheless
be applied.""8
4. Group Vilification. The fourth category contains individ-
uals who seek to enter the arena of political dialogue and have
had to contend with sexual invectives about their gender that re-
inforce sexist stereotypes and limit their ability to participate in
effective political dialogue.99 Individuals are often insulted sexu-
ally in response to their use of nonsexual language to criticize
others. Their legal actions have been unsuccessful, especially in
cases where the response could be considered fictional.100
An example of such a situation occurred in the case of Brooks
96. Id.
97. But see id. at 444 (Breitenstein, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that an individual can
be defamed in a fictional publication when the individual is identifiable).
As Circuit Judge Breitenstein noted in his dissent:
Moral standards may have changed since the First Amendment was adopted but
that change has not gone so far as to protect a publisher which defames an
identifiable living person by relating commission of an act of sexual deviation
and perversion.
Id. at 444 (Breitenstein, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 443.
99. See, e.g., Miller v. Charleston Gazette, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2541 (W. Va. Cir.
Ct. 1983) (male plaintiffs complaint about a cartoon that depicted plaintiff, a candidate for
United States Attorney, in a cage with other animals using various props that were alleg-
edly associated with aberrant sexual behavior, was insufficient to withstand defendant's
summary judgment motion); Guccione v. Hustler, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1981). Cf Shrottman v. Boston Globe, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1487 (Mass. Super. Ct.
1981) (judgment entered for plaintiff on his libel action where a reporter incorrectly attrib-
uted to him a statement using the word "nigger").
It is useful to view this category of cases in the broader context of victims being consid-
ered the cause of their own victimization. For women, the contexts of rape, sexual harass-
ment, spousal abuse, and unwanted pregnancies, have often evoked this response. See, e.g.,
works cited in supra note 28.
100. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 99.
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v. Stone.101 Susan Brooks, a student at Georgia Medical College,
brought a libel action against the school newspaper for publishing
the following description of Brooks: 102 "We have different back-
grounds from the rest of you. Our mothers were German Shep-
herds; our fathers were Camels, so naturally we love to hump
bitches in heat. Say, Ms. Brooks, when do you come in season?" 10 3
One reason that the court held against Brooks T10 was that it
found she had "induced the editors' reply" by commencing the
name-calling campaign by criticizing the newspaper in nonsexual
terms.10 5 The apparent underlying rationale of the court's deci-
sion was that if a woman criticizes a person or publication, espe-
cially with language that is considered inappropriate for women,
she has consented to a reply attacking her sexuality in return.
5. Portrayals of Private Individuals for Commercial Purposes.
The only category of actions involving consentless sexual portray-
als that has had some success consists of cases brought by purely
private individuals who were not aware that their photographs
were being taken.108 Individuals who are portrayed sexually in ad-
vertising have not always consented to their portrayals.1 0 7 Even in
New York, where the New York Civil Rights Statute requires con-
sent before a person can be portrayed in an advertisement, the
use of portrayals without consent persists.108
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts'00 exemplifies this practice. Susan and
Ira Cohen and their daughter, Samantha, were visiting friends
during the weekend of July 4, 1977.110 Susan and Samantha were
bathing in the nude in a stream located on private property when
101. 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1823 (Ga. State Ct., Richmond Co. 1983).
102. Brooks, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1823.
103. Id.
104. The trial court held against Brooks because it found that the piece was fictional.
The statement "cannot be described as a factual attack on the plaintiff's virtue, because of
clearly absurd statements." Id. Thus, a fictional sexual attack was considered not to be
defamatory.
105. Id. at 1824. She had stated that the paper was trash and belonged in the bottom
of bird cages. Id. at 1823.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 109-31. Cf Clark v. Celeb. Publishing, 530 F.
Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff awarded compensatory and punitive damages under
California law for unauthorized publication by a New York publisher of photographs show-
ing plaintiff getting undressed).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 109-31.
108. Id.
109. 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984).
110. Cohen, 63 N.Y.2d at 382, 472 N.E.2d at 308, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
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Ira observed a photographer taking pictures of Susan and
Samantha as they entered the water. Some time later, while flip-
ping through a magazine, Ira recognized his wife and daughter in
a photograph of two nude persons that appeared as part of an
advertisement for a product used to fight cellulite. 111
Susan Cohen brought an action against Herbal Concepts, the
manufacturer of "Au Naturel," under the New York Civil Rights
Statute, seeking damages for publishing the photographs for ad-
vertising purposes. 112 The trial court dismissed the complaint find-
ing that the identity of the plaintiffs could not be determined
from the picture.11 8 The state court of appeals reversed, finding
that the New York statute contains no identification requirement
and that it was sufficient that the plaintiff could identify herself in
the picture.11 4
Other women have also used the New York statute success-
fully. For example, in Moore v. Stonehill Communications,' 5 the
plaintiff was seventeen years old when she posed in a bathing suit
for "test" photographs by a professional photographer.1 The
photographs were intended only for her portfolio and for prac-
tice. The photographer, however, sold the photographs to the
publisher of "High Times Encyclopedia of Recreational Drugs,"
who used the photographs in an advertisement for its product 117
with a caption that suggested Moore was exposing herself sexually
and using drugs.11 8
Moore brought an action under sections 50 and 51 of the
111. The photograph depicted two nude persons, a woman carrying a small object in
her left hand and a young girl entering shallow water. Neither face was visible, but the rear
and side of both persons could be seen. The woman's waist, arms, right breast and buttocks
were visible. The advertising copy described a product, "Au Naturel," in a message di-
rected to women with "fatty lumps and bumps that won't go away." Id. at 382, 472 N.E.2d
at 308, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
112. Id. at 381, 472 N.E.2d at 307, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
113. Id. at 383, 472 N.E.2d at 308, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
114. Id.
115. 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
116. Moore, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1439.
117. One photograph featured Moore posed frontally, sitting on a beach in a bathing
suit, accompanied by a mock-up of the book. The advertising copy stated: "Expose myself?
Why not, if I know what I'm doing. . . . I want to open up to sights, sounds, tastes, smells,
feelings. That's why I expose myself to drugs . . . sometimes. That's why I'm crazy about
this book. I take it everywhere." Id. at 1438-39.
118. The advertisement also claimed that the book related the "truth about sex,
drugs, and aphrodisiacs." Id. at 1439.
1986]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
New York Civil Rights Statute and moved for summary judg-
ment.1191 The defendants conceded that they had never entered
into a contract with Moore permitting the use of the photograph.
The court granted Moore's motion for summary judgment as to
the issue of liability for compensatory damages and for injunctive
relief relative to the further publication, sale, or distribution of
the photograph. 120 Further, the court found that whether the de-
fendants knew that the photograph was used without the plain-
tiff's consent was irrelevant to the questions of compensatory dam-
ages and injunctive relief.121
Similar actions brought in other jurisdictions, however, have
not fared as well. 22 For instance, Christina McCabe brought libel,
portrayal in a false light, and publicity given to private life claims
in a Pennsylvania district court 123 after she was portrayed in the
centerfold of Village Voice.1 24 Although the photographer had as-
sured the editor that he had written releases, he conceded at trial
that the releases were not signed by McCabe.125
On a summary judgment motion, the court ruled in favor of
119. She also sought to sever her third cause of action for libel. Id. at 1438,
120. Id. at 1439.
121. Id.
122. See Valentine v. CBS, 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's allegations that
song lyrics describing plaintiff's role as a murder witness were defamatory, invaded her
privacy, and constituted an unauthorized publication of her name in violation of state law
were not sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for summary judgment). But see Wood
v. Hustler Mag., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for female plaintiff
after Hustler Magazine published a stolen photograph depicting plaintiff in the nude, that
was submitted with a forged consent form; reversing judgment for plaintiff's husband), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's
allegation that picture was obtained through fraudulently induced consent resulted in jury
award for plaintiff that included compensatory and punitive damages under Texas law),
cert. denied sub noma., Chic Mag. v. Braun, 105 S. Ct. 252 (1984).
123. McCabe v. Village Voice, 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In addition, plain-
tiff's complaint included a separate negligence count, which the court denied, insofar as it
did not contain allegations distinct from her other claims. Id. at 526 n. 1.
124. McCabe met Donald Herron at a San Fransisco art gallery. She was introduced to
Herron by a mutual friend and agreed to have him photograph her. Herron informed her
at the time, around 1978, that he intended to use the photograph in a book he was publish-
ing. She allegedly made no response and did not sign a release permitting him to use the
photographs. Early in 1980, Herron contacted the centerfold editor of The Village Voice to
ask if he might be interested in publishing some of Herron's work. In April, 1980, the
Voice centerfold featured Herron's photographs, including that of McCabe. Underneath
her photograph was a caption reading, "Christina McCabe - Model." Id. at 527- 28.
125. Id. at 527.
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the defendants on the libel and portrayal in a false light claims.12
It denied defendants' motion on the publicity given to private life
claim.1 27 The court found that the photograph of the plaintiff,
taken in a bathtub, was not sexually suggestive and was not capa-
ble of a defamatory meaning, nor did it place the plaintiff in a
false light. 1 2 The only reading of the photograph of which the
court could conceive was the suggestion that the reader should
bathe. " Therefore, the court found no grounds on which the
plaintiff could prevail on the libel and false light claims.
In considering the publicity given to private life claim, how-
ever, the court did find that the publication of a nude photograph
of a private individual met the standard of publication of a matter
which "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person" and "is
not of legitimate concern to the public."'1 0 The court offered no
explanation for its distinction that the photograph was offensive
yet not defamatory. Underlying the court's analysis was an inabil-
ity to take seriously the plaintiff's contention that she was injured
by the implication that she had "asked" to be portrayed as a sex-
ual object.181  McCabe did not consider the photograph to be
about bathing, as the court interpreted it. Rather, she considered
126. Id. at 526.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 528-29.
129. The court stated:
In this case, considering the totality of the printed material, including the title
of the feature "Centerfold," and the accompanying photographs, the plaintiff's
photograph and the designation "Model," I find the publication incapable of
defamatory meaning. Neither the plaintiff's photograph, nor the entire feature,
is obscene or even suggestive. Nothing in the presentation suggests that the
plaintiff is sexually promiscuous. While some readers might conclude that the
plaintiff was supportive of avant garde photography, this communication cannot
support a defamation claim.
Id. at 528 (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 529 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D). The distinction
may have been based on the court's observation that "defendants apparently concede that
publication of a nude photograph would normally meet the standards of [publicity given to
private life claim]". McCabe, 550 F. Supp. at 529. The defendants chose to challenge that
aspect of plaintiff's claim by arguing that McCabe was reasonably understood to have con-
sented to the publication of her picture and that publication was of legitimate concern to
the public, rather than to challenge whether the publication was highly offensive under the
standards of a publicity given to private life claim. Recognizing that concession, however,
does not explain why the parties (and the court) agreed to assume that the photograph was
highly offensive for the publicity given to the private life claim, but not highly offensive for
the libel and false light claim.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
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it to be a statement that she had requested to be publicly por-
trayed in the nude.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Rather than view these cases as only involving problems of
privacy-that automatically give way to an articulation of any free
speech interest-these cases should be analyzed as presenting in-
fringements of additional substantial rights. It should be recog-
nized that published consentless sexual portrayals may infringe
the sex-based civil rights, privacy rights and free speech rights of
the individual portrayed as well as invoke the free speech interests
of the publishers. A framework should be applied to these cases
that would consider this full set of rights.
The framework proposed below would protect individuals
from being portrayed publicly without their consent under a four-
part balancing standard which considers each of the fundamental
interests implicated by these cases. 3 2 When an individual brings
an invasion of privacy action under common law or state law for a
consentless sexual portrayal, a court would have to determine
whether a publisher's action was lawful under the following bal-
ancing test:
(a) where the person portrayed has been portrayed in a sexual
context and has not been portrayed in a context in which he or
she is a public figure, the court should determine whether the
portrayal served a compelling public interest and whether ob-
taining the person's consent would have caused extreme undue
hardship;
(b) where the person portrayed has not been portrayed in a sexual
context and has not been portrayed in a context in which he or
she is a public figure, the court should determine whether the
portrayal served a substantial public interest and whether ob-
taining the person's consent would have caused substantial undue
hardship;
(c) where the person portrayed has been portrayed in a sexual
context and has been portrayed in a context in which he or she is
132. This framework of limited regulation to encourage free speech has been recog-
nized in other contexts as effective and beneficial. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v.
Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985) (fair use doctrine in copyright law). Cf Merryman,
The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976) (artist's moral right to con-
trol dissemination or destruction of her own art work).
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a public figure, the court should determine whether the portrayal
served a substantial public interest and whether obtaining the per-
son's consent would have caused substantial undue hardship;
(d) where the person portrayed has not been portrayed in a sexual
context and has been portrayed in a context in which he or she is
a public figure, the court should determine whether the portrayal
served a significant public interest and whether obtaining the per-
son's consent would have caused significant undue hardship.
Each fundamental interest would not necessarily be raised in
all cases considered under this framework. The individual's pri-
vacy and free speech rights would be invoked if the individual
were portrayed without consenting; the individual's sex-based civil
rights would be invoked if the portrayal were sexual. The pub-
lisher's free speech rights would always be invoked in these cases;
however, the strength of that right would depend upon whether
the publication was newsworthy rather than commercial. For ex-
ample, if the portrayal invoked both sex-based civil rights (e.g., a
woman was portrayed sexually because she is a woman) and the
right to privacy, it would receive stronger protection under this
framework than would a situation that only invoked one funda-
mental right. If the individual portrayed were also a public figure,
the framework would balance the fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual portrayed against the importance of disseminating informa-
tion about public figures. Because the framework would only pro-
vide relief if the portrayal occurred without the consent of the
individual portrayed, it would not directly regulate speech on the
basis of content.
This proposed framework reflects the Supreme Court's re-
cent holding in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.1'" The issue in
Jaycees was whether a Minnesota statute unconstitutionally inter-
fered with the Jaycees' freedom of association rights as guaran-
teed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.'"
133. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
134. Id. at 610. Under the Minnesota Statute it was an unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice for a place of public accomodation to deny persons the full and equal enjoyment of
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accomodations because of race, color,
creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act contained the following relevant provision:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed,
1986]
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The Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of the statute by
balancing the Jaycees' interest in free association against the other
fundamental interests served by the statute.135 The Minnesota
statute survived first amendment challenge under that framework
because "Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimi-
nation against its female citizens justifies the impact that applica-
tion of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members'
associational freedoms."136
The Court in Jaycees described the importance of eradicating
sex discrimination and its accompanying injury with some of the
strongest language ever used by a majority of the Supreme Court.
It categorized the injury at issue as a "deprivation of personal dig-
nity' 187 and a "stigmatizing injury" that "is surely felt as strongly
by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of sex as by those
treated differently because of their race."' 3 Because sex distinc-
tions have historically received a lower level of judicial scrutiny
than race distinctions,13 9 that statement provides strong support
for the ability of courts to balance violations of sex-based rights
against other fundamental rights. 40
religion, disability, national origin or sex.
MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982). 468 U.S. at 615.
Women who were denied full voting membership in the Jaycees because of their sex
brought a challenge to the Jaycees' membership policies under that statute. 468 U.S. at
614. Before a hearing took place on the state charges, theJaycees brought a federal action
to enjoin enforcement of the Minnesota statute, alleging it violated male members' consti-
tutional rights of free speech and association. The federal district court certified to the
Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether the Jaycees qualified as a place of pub-
lic accommodation within the meaning of the statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found that the Jaycees did qualify as a place of public accommodation and the district court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The court of appeals reversed. Id. at 615-16.
The United States Supreme Court found that the statute did not abridge either the
male members' freedom of intimate association or their freedom of expressive association,
and that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Id. at 618-31.
135. Id. at 622-29. According to the Court:
Infringements on that right [right to free association] may be justified by regu-
lations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.
Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 623.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 625.
139. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(suggesting middle-tier approach to sex discrimination).
140. In addition to using the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court, the pro-
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The Supreme Court's balancing of the freedom of expressive
association interest against the civil rights interest is directly appli-
cable to the framework suggested above, because those interests
are analogous to the interests presented in consentless sexual por-
trayals. A male Jaycee's right to freedom of expressive association
is analogous to a publisher's right to free speech, because both
rights derive from the first amendment's protections."" More-
over, a female Jaycee's interest in the freedom to become a full
member without regard to her sex is analogous to a woman's in-
terest in controlling her sex-based portrayals, because both inter-
ests derive from an interest in sex-based civil rights.44 Accord-
ingly, it is appropriate to balance women's sex-based interest
in being free from consentless sexual portrayals against pub-
lishers' first amendment interests, as suggested in the proposed
posed framework has several other features which were critical in the determination to
uphold the Minnesota statute. First, the statute was not aimed at the suppression of speech.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623. Second, it did not distinguish between prohibited and permitted
activity on the basis of viewpoint. Id. Third, the statute's purpose could not be achieved
through significantly less restrictive means. Id. at 626. The Minnesota statute was able to
survive analysis under the above factors because of the evidence in the record of the
"State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens
equal access to publicly available goods and services." Id. at 624. The Court found that any
infringement of first amendment rights was incidental and minimal, rather than a basic
component of the statute's purpose and structure. Id. at 627. Hence, the statute survived
first amendment challenge.
The Court's holding inJaycees provides strong support for the framework proposed in
this Article. Like the Minnesota public accommodations statute, the proposed framework
would seek to vindicate violations of the sex-based civil rights, free speech rights and pri-
vacy rights of the individual portrayed. Vindication of these rights would indirectly limit a
publisher's first amendment free speech rights, but not because of the content of the re-
stricted speech.
Any infringement on a publisher's first amendment rights would be minimal because of
the consent-focused (rather than content-focused) perspective of the framework. This
framework would not absolutely prohibit any particular speech on the basis of content.
Publishers could still sexually portray women in any conceivable manner, as long as they
had the consent of the individual portrayed.
141: According to the Court inJaycees:
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the Government
for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interfer-
ence by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaranteed. . . . Consequently, we have long under-
stood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.
Id. at 622.
142. See supra note 31.
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framework.
The constitutionality of this approach has received further
support from the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's recent decision in American Booksellers' Association v. Hud-
nut,143 a case concerning the constitutionality of the Indianapolis
Anti-Pornography Ordinance.1 4 4 Although the Seventh Circuit
struck down the ordinance, it noted that the problem of victimiza-
tion of individuals in the production of pornography is an impor-
tant problem that states can constitutionally regulate, even if such
regulation limits publishers' free speech rights.1 45 It justified that
statement with the observations that such regulation would be
content-neutral and that a state has a strong interest in forbidding
such conduct. 14 The Supreme Court's summary affirmance leaves
that discussion intact.
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dun & Brad-
street v. Greenmoss Builders1 47 makes it clear that commercial
speech is entitled to less protection than political speech. The
Court observed that commercial speech "occupies a 'subordinate
position in the scale of first amendment values.' "148 Thus, the
Court concluded that commercial speech "may be regulated in
ways that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression. 14
By contrast, limiting sexual portrayals through enhanced di-
rect regulation of speech solely on the basis of its content is un-
constitutional 5" and undesirable in light of the state's history of
using its power, including its power to control speech, to ensure
143. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
144. See supra note 3.
145. American Booksellers, 711 F.2d at 332-33.
146. Id.
147. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality opin-
ion). The issue in this case was whether the actual malice standard could be reduced to
negligence when the defamatory statements involved no issue of public concern. Id. at
2944.
148. Id. at 2945, n.5 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)).
149. Id. This commercial speech/noncommercial speech distinction received further
support from two recent Supreme Court cases, Arcara v. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. 3172
(1986) (holding that first amendment does not bar enforcement of a statute authorizing
closure of adult bookstore that is used as place of prostitution); Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (holding that first amendment does not prevent
school district from disciplining student for giving an offensive speech).
150. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
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male control over women's sexuality.151 For instance, under a con-
tent-based approach that sought to expand the definition of ob-
scenity, literature on topics such as abortion or birth control
would be as likely to come under attack as hard-core pornogra-
phy. 5 2 Similarly, attempts to create erotic portrayals of women's
sexuality might be attacked under a content-based approach by
individuals who find such portrayals degrading. 53 Even if such le-
151. See FACT brief, supra note 3, at 6-8 (tracing the historical suppression of birth
control information because the materials were deemed sexually explicit). See, e.g., United
States v. One Book Entitled "Contraceptions," 51 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 193 1) (prosecution for
distribution of books by Marie Stopes on contraception); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d
564 (2d Cir. 1930) (prosecution of Mary Ware Dennett for publication of pamphlet ex-
plaining sexual physiology and functions to children); Bours v. United States, 229 F. 960
(7th Cir. 1915) (prosecution of physician for mailing a letter indicating that he might per-
form a therapeutic abortion); People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 163 N.Y.S. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1917)
(prosecution for distributing materials to women). For a further discussion of the history of
state regulation of birth control related material, see Duggan, supra note 3.
See also FACT brief, supra note 3, at 1-32. According to Erica Jong, writer, poet and
opponent of the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance: "Should censorship be imposed again,
whether through the kind of legislation introduced in Minneapolis and Indianapolis or
through other means, feminists would be the first to suffer." Blakely, supra note 3, at 38.
See also Blakely, supra note 3, at 38 (statement of Barbara Kerr); Blakely, supra note 3, at
120 (statements of Nan Hunter); Aryeh, Brownmiller, Elshtain, Goldstein, Jong, Lapham,
& Neier, The Place of Pornography, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Nov. 1984, at 31; Walkowitz, Male
Vice and Female Virtue: Feminism and the Politics of Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century Britain in
POWERS OF DESIRE. THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 419-38 (1983) [hereinafter PowERS OF DE-
SIRE] (arguing that, historically, women's attempts to set the standards of sexual conduct
have been easily subverted into repressive campaigns antithetical to the values and ideas of
feminism); Transcript of Workshop, supra note 6.
Catharine MacKinnon, although she co-authored the Minneapolis ordinance and has
been one of its strongest proponents, has also recognized the dangers of vesting the state
with power over women's sexuality:
[Tihe state is male in the feminist sense. The law sees and treats women the
way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively
constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender, through its legiti-
mizing norms, relation to society, and substantive policies. It achieves this
through embodying and ensuring male control over women's sexuality at every
level, occasionally cushioning, qualifying or de jure prohibiting its excesses
when necessary to its normalization.
MacKinnon, SIGNS II, supra note 28, at 644.
The fact that individuals who seek to enhance women's civil rights may draft legislation
does not change the reality that male control exists at "every level." Judges must enforce
legislation, law enforcement agencies must make policy decisions about what types of cases
to pursue, and lawyers must make arguments on behalf of clients. At all of these stages the
maleness of the state could have a strong impact upon any legislation, even if it were
drafted by individuals with the best intentions and ideas.
152. See Walkowitz, supra note 151; Alter, supra note 3.
153. This criticism has surfaced in the debate over the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordi-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
gal attacks were not successful, they could threaten the already
precarious financial situation of many feminist publishers. 154
Hence, if a new framework is to be developed, courts should
not make content-based judgments of what types of portrayals are
harmful to all women. Instead, courts should determine which
fundamental interests are raised by an individual's invasion of pri-
vacy action occasioned by a consentless portrayal. Under this pro-
posed framework, individuals would have control over their basic
sexual integrity, including its expression in public portrayals, to
fully protect their sex-based and free speech rights.155
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The fact that plaintiffs who bring actions relating to their
consentless sexual portrayals usually fail to prevail is disturbing.
Although courts have expressed sympathy for these plaintiffs, they
have often erroneously believed that various legal doctrines-the
actual malice standard for public figures, the definition of a public
figure, the recognizability requirement for fictional portrayals,
and the lack of injury from group vilification-precluded them
from awarding relief. In actuality, these doctrines are not consti-
tutionally required in many of these cases. Alternatively, these in-
dividuals might attain relief under the framework introduced in
Part III.1"'
nance. See FACT brief, supra note 3, at 14-15 (observing that some women might consider
explicit lesbian sexual portrayals as demeaning or subordinating, especially in light of the
historical prejudice that has existed against lesbians and gay men).
154. Several feminist publications have recently stopped publishing or have found it
necessary to take a break from publishing for financial reasons. See 15 OFF OUR BACKS, June
1985 at I (reporting that the NEw WOMEN'S TIMES, BIG MAMA RAG, EQUAL TIMES, FEMINIST
CONNECTION, COMMONWOMAN and WOMEN OF COLOR NEWS all stopped publishing, and that
SOJOURNER, VALLEY WOMEN'S VOICE and the DETROIT WOMEN'S VOICE have been able to
continue publication only after a recent successful fundraising effort).
155. See supra note 31.
156. Nevertheless, a consent-focused approach does have two key shortcomings. First,
though expanding our understanding of who is injured by unwelcome sexual portrayals,
see, e.g., Bryant, Sexual Display of Women's Bodies-A Violation of Privacy, 10 GOLDEN GATE L.
REv. 1211 (1980) (ignoring injury to individual portrayed); Jacobs, supra note 1; Principles
of Expression and Restriction: A First Amendment Symposium, 40 U. Prr. L. REv. 517-660
(1979), this approach ignores the possibility that injury to society as a whole may arise from
either consensual or nonconsensual sexual portrayals. In failing to focus on this aspect of
the injury, this Article does not intend to suggest that this aspect of the injury is not impor-
tant. It is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
Second, a consent-focused approach, while avoiding some of the free speech problems
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A. Portrayals of Public Figures
1. Public Figure Requirements. Well-known nonpolitical indi-
viduals, often models and actresses, have failed to prevail because
of the imposition of the actual malice standard to their cases.
Under the proposed framework, courts would not necessarily be
constrained by that standard.
Despite the holdings in the cited cases involving Ann-Margret
and Cathy Davis, Time, Inc. v. Hill 157 does not require that the
standards for defamation be applied to such cases.158 The issue in
Time, Inc. was whether the actual malice standard, which had
evolved in defamation actions brought by public figures under
New York Times v. Sullivan, 5 9 should be applied to "false light"
invasion of privacy actions brought under the New York statute.
The actual malice standard had developed to protect publishers
faced by a content-focused approach, does not avoid all such problems. The first amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ...... US. CONST. amend. I. That provi-
sion applies to the states via the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Content-based legislation is highly disfavored under
the first amendment. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Because a
consent-focused approach is content neutral, it avoids some first amendment problems
faced by the content-based proposed Minneapolis ordinance. Specifically, the media's right
to report information of public interest may clash with the desire of the individuals por-
trayed to keep information about themselves from the public. See generally Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
In addition, although the language of the first amendment is absolute, courts use a bal-
ancing test to analyze alleged infringements of first amendment rights. See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW (1978). First amendment considerations prevail
when state actions infringe upon free speech, unless a state can demonstrate that its regula-
tions serve a compelling state interest and invoke the least possible restriction on free
speech. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Many commenta-
tors argue that the courts recognize different types of speech that receive varying levels of
protection under the above framework. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra at 578-608. For instance,
commercial speech receives less protection than speech containing news stories. See, e.g.,
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). See
also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
158. Although the Ann-Margret court did not explicitly state that it was applying an
"actual malice" standard, one could imply the use of that standard in the court's discussion
of the higher standard that must be applied to public figures who bring invasion of privacy
actions. See supra note 48. An allegation of falsity is only necessary in "false light" invasion
of privacy actions. See supra note 34.
159. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official must prove actual malice
before liability may ensue in a defamation action against critics of the official's conduct). See
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (extending the actual malice stan-
dard to public figures who may not be public officials).
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who made good faith attempts to publish accurate and news-
worthy information from defamation actions.160 Under the actual
malice standard, unless a plaintiff can show that the publisher ac-
ted with "reckless disregard for the truth" in publishing false and
defamatory information, the public figure cannot obtain relief. 1
The Time, Inc. Court found that the actual malice standard
should be applied to "false light" invasion of privacy cases because
of the similarity between such actions and defamation actions. 62
In both types of actions a plaintiff's central allegation is that he or
she has been falsely portrayed in published materials. The Time,
Inc. Court, however, expressly limited its holding to "false light"
actions.163 It stated that its holding did not necessarily apply to
other types of invasion of privacy actions, such as an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.'"
160. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (commenting that a
state statute which permitted the law to presume injury from the act of publication itself,
rather than requiring proof of actual malice in cases against public officials, would
"threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular
views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.").
161. Id.
162. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
163. Id. at 387-88.
164. "This limitation [application of actual malice standard] to newsworthy persons
and events does not of course foreclose an interpretation of the statute to allow damages
where 'Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position
as to outrage the community's notions of decency.'" Id. at 383-84 n.7 (1967) (quoting Sidis
v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
The Court then listed a host of cases in which the right of privacy was held to give way to
the right of the press to publish matters of public interest. Id.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Harper & Row v. National Enters., 105 S. Ct.
2218 (1985) also provides support for the constitutionality of the proposed statute. The
Court was faced with the question of whether the "fair use" doctrine under the Copyright
Act should be expanded to include a "public figure" exception. Id. at 2228-31. The pur-
pose of such an exception would be to protect the media from liability under the Copyright
Act for publishing copyrighted, newsworthy material without obtaining the author's con-
sent. Id. at 2227-31. Under existing copyright doctrine, the public importance of material
does not affect its protection under the fair use doctrine. Id. at 2228-31.
The Court in Harper & Row held that a public figure exception to the fair use doctrine
should not be recognized. In reaching that decision, it emphasized that the protection of
first amendment interests includes the protection of the free speech rights of the author, as
well as those of the publisher. In the Court's words:
[F]reedom of thought [and expression] "includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977) (Burger, C.J.). We do not suggest that this right not to speak
would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to
suppress facts. But in the words of New York's Chief Judge Fuld: "The essen-
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Given that Ann-Margret's action was based on allegations of
intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than a "false
light" portrayal, the holding in Time, Inc. should have been irrele-
vant to her action. Ann-Margret did not allege that the defendant
falsely portrayed her; she was undisputably the person portrayed
partially nude in the photographs. Her suit stemmed from an alle-
gation that the defendant had reason to believe that its publica-
tion of her photograph was offensive and invaded her privacy.
Logically, it did not make sense to require Ann-Margret to show
that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the truth because
all of the information published by the defendant was in fact
truthful.
Ann-Margret's action differed from a defamation action or
false light action in another respect. The core of a defamation ac-
tion is the allegation that a third party has made a false statement
about the plaintiff.16 5 Ann-Margret, however, was not a third
party, but rather was the speaker in the public statement. The de-
fendant figuratively put words in her mouth by forcing her to be
portrayed in a context that she found objectionable.16 6 Ann-Mar-
gret, therefore, had a free speech interest that is not present in
the traditional defamation context. The proposed framework
would recognize the free speech and sex-based civil rights impli-
cated in cases-similar to Ann-Margret's and would, therefore, re-
fuse to apply the stringent actual malice standard.
tial thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the
voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields that man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suita-
bly defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250,
255, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 776 (1968).
Harper & Row, 105 S. Ct. at 2230 (1985) (Court's emphasis).
The Court's focus on the free speech rights of the author is relevant to the proposed
legislation, because this legislation seeks to protect those free speech rights in the context
of sexual expression. Nevertheless, the applicability of Harper & Row to the present context
is limited because copyright regulation is specifically permitted under the United States
Constitution, article I, section 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
165. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
166. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (slogan on New Hampshire




Similarly, the Davis application of the actual malice standard
was inappropriate. The court's rationale for applying the actual
malice standard to Davis' case was that she was a "limited pur-
pose" public figure in the context of the portrayal."' Limited
purpose public figures are public figures in some contexts but not
in others.1 6 8 The actual malice standard only applies to those con-
texts in which they are portrayed as public figures.
The Davis court of appeals found that Davis was a limited
purpose public figure in the context of boxing.169 That finding is
indisputable. However, the court also found that the magazine
had portrayed her in that context.1 70 This latter finding is ques-
tionable as Celebrity Skin did not portray Davis as a powerful
boxer-the role in which she was a public figure. Instead, she was
portrayed in a topless pose. In portraying Davis topless, Celebrity
Skin stripped her of her power by depicting her as a sex object.
The caption clarified the role in which she was being portrayed by
describing her sexually and not as a boxer. Similarly, Celebrity Skin
did not portray Ann-Margret in her publicrole as an actress, but
rather focused on her sexual characteristics. The magazine at-
tempted to develop a new context in which Davis and Ann-Mar-
gret would be considered public figures. No attempt was made to
display them in the context in which they were already known.
Moreover, the Time, Inc. actual malice standard did not need
to be applied to Davis' action because her action did not depend
on a "false light" allegation. Davis could have brought an invasion
of privacy action against the defendant, even if the photograph
had been of her, so long as she had taken reasonable steps to keep
167. Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., 90 A.D.2d 374, 384, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 316 (1982).
168. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court ex-
amined whether Gertz was a public figure in the context of a particular controversy. Later
courts have relied on that analysis to recognize the concept of "limited purpose" public
figures. See, e.g., Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S.
815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 380 (4th
Cir. 1971); Vitale v. National Lampoon, 449 F. Supp. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
169. Davis v. High Soc'y Mag., 90 A.D.2d 374, 384, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 316 (1982).
170. The Davis court found:
She is not a public figure in the general sense. . . . However, within the con-
text of female boxing, she's apparently very public and well-known. Since the
photos and caption are related to female boxing and are the subjects of this
lawsuit, plaintiff must be considered a limited-purpose public figure as a matter
of law.
Id. at 384, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
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the photograph private. Hence, the proposed framework would
analyze Davis' action by first inquiring as to whether she had been
portrayed in a context in which she was a public figure and by
then inquiring as to whether attempting to attain her consent
would have been unduly burdensome.
The Seventh Circuit recently suggested in Douglass v. Hus-
tler 17 1 that the actual malice standard may not be necessary in a
case involving a consentless sexual portrayal of a well-known ac-
tress. One issue in the case was whether Hustler had properly ob-
tained a release before publishing a nude photograph of
Douglass.17 2 Although the court did not reach the issue of
whether the actual malice standard was necessary, it noted:
As an original matter we have our doubts [about whether the actual malice
standard is required]. The purpose of requiring proof of knowledge or fal-
sity, or reckless disregard for the truth, is to lighten the investigative bur-
dens on the press of determining the truth of what it writes. It is no great
burden to determine whether a release has been executed; it is not like as-
certaining the truth about allegations that a government official took a bribe
or engaged in insider trading or fudged casualty statistics. A requirement
that the plaintiff prove that the defendant was negligent in mistaking the
existence of the release might be quite enough to protect the press from
having to make costly investigations.173
Thus, under the proposed framework, courts would first de-
termine which fundamental rights each party could invoke. The
inquiry would then turn to the issue of how burdensome it would
have been for the publisher to obtain the individual's consent.
The level of burdensomeness permitted would depend upon the
relative strength of the civil rights, privacy rights, and free speech
rights presented by the parties' positions. This framework reflects
the Supreme Court's recent holding in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees 74 that certain fundamental rights such as sex-based civil
rights and the free speech rights of the individual portrayed can
be balanced against, and override, freedom of speech
considerations.
2. Context of Portrayal. Another reason why Ann-Margret
failed to prevail was that the court found that she did not have the
171. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1140.
174. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
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right to consent to each context in which she was portrayed. The
New York statute's silence on that issue and the Supreme Court's
holding in Time, Inc.175 were the bases for that decision. The court
found that a public figure who consents to a portrayal in one con-
text cannot object to an accurate reproduction of that portrayal in
another context . 76 This finding, however, ignores the fact that
Ann-Margret had a free speech right, as well as a privacy right, to
have control over the message she expressed through the por-
trayal of her sexuality. Instead of being used to preclude the indi-
vidual portrayed from obtaining recovery, Time, Inc.'s require-
ment that courts consider the free speech interests present in such
cases should be used as the basis for an argument that courts must
consider the free speech interests of the individual portrayed, as
well as those of the publisher.
Nevertheless, the district court was not entirely hostile to
Ann-Margret's claim. It "sympathize[d] with her feelings" and
suggested that it might have ruled in her favor had it been more
aware of the full range of fundamental interests at issue in that
case.1 77 Application of a framework that would protect an individ-
ual's civil rights and free speech rights to consent to each context
in which his or her sexual portrayal is used could permit the
court's "sympathy" to have substantive application.
B. Portrayals of Private Persons as Part of a News Story
As demonstrated above, private individuals have limited op-
portunity for relief if they are portrayed sexually in a news story.
Under the proposed framework, courts must consider the individ-
ual's free speech and sex-based civil rights interests rather than
only the media's free speech interests. In Ruby Clark's case, the
district court failed to consider her interests in privacy. However,
the court of appeals did balance Clark's right to be free from def-
175. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
176. Id.
177. In the opinion of the court:
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff is unhappy about the appearance of her picture in
the defendants' magazine. And while the Court can sympathize with her feel-
ings, the fact that she does not like the manner in which she is portrayed ...
or the medium in which her picture is reproduced,. . . and her belief that such
reproduction has caused her embarrassment, . . . do not expand her rights or
create any cause of action under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law.
Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Mag., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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amation against the media's right to report news of public inter-
est.178 Because the broadcast was inaccurate, and Clark was not a
public figure, the final balance was in Clark's favor. Clark would
have benefitted if a clear framework had existed to inform the
district court that it needed to engage in such a balancing test.
The Doe court believed that Cohn v. Cox Broadcasting Corp.
precluded it from balancing the interests raised by the case. The
Supreme Court decision, New York v. Ferber,179 however, speaks di-
rectly to the limited application of the Cohn holding to these types
of cases.180
In Ferber, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a child
pornography statute after conducting a balancing test between the
first amendment interests and the state's interest in protecting the
welfare of children." In order to conduct such a balancing test
and to recognize the importance of children's welfare, the Court
178. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
179. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
180. In New York v. Ferber, the Court was presented with the constitutionality of a state
statute that prohibited persons from knowingly promoting a sexual performance of a child
under the age of 16 by distributing material which depicts such a performance. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 263 (McKinney 1980). Section 263.15 provides that a person is guilty of a class D
felony (punishable by up to seven years for individuals and up to $10,000 for corporations)
if that person: "promot[es] a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character
and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age." Section 263.00(5) defines "pro-
mote" as follows: "'Promote' means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide,
lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present,
exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same."
181. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. Paul Ferber challenged the constitutionality of the state
statute as a defense to his conviction. Ferber had been indicted on two counts under a
related statute, which required a finding that the sexual performance was obscene, and on
two counts under the statute cited above, which did not require such a finding. He was
acquitted under the first statute and was found guilty under the latter statute. The New
York Court of Appeals overturned his conviction on first amendment grounds. Id. at 752.
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari to resolve the
question: "To prevent the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for
commercial purposes, could the New York State Legislature, consistent with the First
Amendment, prohibit the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in sex-
ual conduc, regardless of whether such material is obscene?" Id. at 753. In the opinion of
the Court:
When a definable class of material, such as that covered by 263.15 [the state
statute], bears so heavily and persuasively on the welfare of children engaged in
its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and
that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the
First Amendment.
Id. at 764.
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had to distinguish Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.18 The Supreme
Court's 1975 holding in Cox Broadcasting Corp. did not appear to
permit any balancing against first amendment interests when the
published materials were of public interest. However, relying on a
more recent Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing Co.,15 3 the Court in Ferber was able to restrict the implications
of the Cox Broadcasting Corp. holding. 8 4
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that interests of the highest order might permit restric-
tions of truthful information obtained during court proceedings
182. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The issue in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn was the constitu-
tionality of a state statute that made it unlawful to publish, or cause to be published, any
information concerning "the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or
upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape may have been made." The full provi-
sion reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and pub-
lish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public
dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or dis-
seminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publication pub-
lished in this State or through any radio or television broadcast originating in
the State the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or upon
whom an assault with intent to commit rape may have been made. Any person
or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be
punished as for a misdemeanor.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
A reporter had published the name of a rape victim after obtaining the name from
indictments that were made available for public inspection during the trial. 420 U.S. 469,
472 & n.3 (1975). In addition to examining the indictments, he learned the name of the
victim from personal observation. Id. The Supreme Court held that the statute was not
constitutional because it infringed upon the publication of truthful information that was of
public interest. Id. at 495. Its finding that the information was of public interest was pre-
mised on the observation that the state had consistently treated the information with that
label. According to the Court, "[b]y placing the information in the public domain on offi-
cial court record, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest
was thereby being served." Id.
The Court suggested that the state could only have limited publication of the informa-
tion if it had consistently treated the information as private. The Court stated: "[i]f there
are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by
means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information." Id. at
496.
A state may not make information available to the public in judicial proceedings and
then try to restrict its publication by the media. The Court found that, "[o]nce true infor-
mation is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot
be sanctioned for publishing it." Id.
183. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
184. 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982).
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or in other public forums.18 5 Although the Court found that the
statute limiting news coverage was unconstitutional, it did conduct
a balancing test before reaching that result. The Court defined
the test as follows: "if a newspaper lawfully obtains information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a
need to further a state interest of the highest order.'"186
The interest asserted by the state in Daily Mail was the protec-
tion of the anonymity of the juvenile offender in order to further
his or her possibility of rehabilitation. The Court found that the
asserted interest was significant, but not of the highest order187
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence, agreed with the Court's
holding but found that the state's articulated interest was of the
185. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). The issue in Daily Mail was whether a state could constitu-
tionally impose criminal sanctions on a newspaper for accurately publishing an alleged ju-
venile delinquent's name. The statute at issue stated:
[N]or shall the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under
this chapter, be published in any newspaper without a written order of the
court. . . . A person who violates ... a provision of this chapter for which
punishment has not been specifically provided, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one
hundred dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor more than six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment.
W. VA. CODE §§ 49-7-3, 49-7-20 (1976).
Two newspapers had purportedly violated the statute by publishing the name of the
alleged assailants after interviewing various witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecut-
ing attorney. After being indicted for violating the statute, the newspapers filed an origi-
nal-jurisdiction petition with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, seeking a writ
of prohibition against the prosecuting attorney and alleging that the statute violated the
first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and several provisions
of the State Constitution. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued the writ of
prohibition, 161 W. Va. 684, 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
186. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
187. Moreover, it found that the statute did not serve the articulated purpose becaiuse
it only restricted newspapers from publishing the information. The electronic media and
other types of publishers were permitted, and did, publish the information in question.
Finally, the Court found that criminal penalties were not necessary to achieve the statute's
purpose. Id. at 104-05.
The Court also emphasized the narrowness of its holding:
Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue before us of unlawful press
access to confidential judicial proceedings, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. at 496 n.26; there is no issue here of privacy or prejudicial pretrial
publicity. At issue is simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publica-
tion of an alleged delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The
asserted state interest cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanc-
tions on this type of publication.
Id. at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
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"highest order." '88 He concurred in the decision because he
agreed that the state statute did not accomplish its stated purpose
by prohibiting only newspapers from printing the names of youths
charged in juvenile proceedings. 8" Rehnquist concluded with the
observation that "a generally effective ban on publication that ap-
plied to all forms of mass communication, electronic and print
media alike, would be constitutional. '""0 Thus, he objected to the
statute's framework rather than to its purpose.
The Supreme Court's holding in Ferber and distinction of Cox
and Daily Mail suggest that Rehnquist's concurrence in Daily Mail
is reflective of the Court's present position. The Court in Ferber
found that publication of sexual portrayals posed a great threat to
children because of the long-term potential of private sexual ac-
tions being made public anytime during that child's life."" In spite
of Cox and Daily Mail, the Court held that protecting a child from
such abuse was considered to be a state interest of the highest or-
der which could override first amendment considerations. The
Court balanced the competing interests rather than assume that
first amendment considerations necessarily prevailed. The Court
described its rationale for conducting a balancing test by distin-
guishing Cox and Daily Mail.19 2 Rather than emphasize the uncon-
stitutionality of the Cox and Daily Mail statutes and the limited na-
ture of a state's right to protect the interests of children and
juveniles, the Court emphasized in Ferber that those cases "only"
applied to situations where the state could not articulate a compel-
ling interest.193
188. Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.1 (1982).
192.
Thus, distribution of the material [child pornography] violates "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599 (1977). Respondent cannot undermine the force of the privacy inter-
ests involved here by looking to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), cases protect-
ing the right of newspapers to publish, respectively, the identity of a rape victim
and a youth charged as a juvenile offender. Those cases only stand for the pro-
position that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a mat-
ter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest order."
Id. at 759 n.10 (citations omitted). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
193. That emphasis is consistent with the Court's final statement in Daily Mail. See
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The holding in Ferber supports the constitutionality of the
framework suggested in this Article. It established that first
amendment interests can be balanced against other first amend-
ment interests. Ferber, however, is limited to the context of a state
trying to protect children or juveniles. It does not explicitly re-
spond to the question of whether sex-based civil rights may also
be balanced against first amendment free speech rights. The Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees1 "
responds to that issue by holding that a state may seek to protect
women's civil rights and free speech rights at the expense of pub-
lishers' first amendment free speech interests.
C. Portrayals of Persons in Fiction
Part II of this Article demonstrated that courts often believe
that they cannot provide relief to individuals who are portrayed
sexually in fiction. Under the proposed framework, these individ-
uals could prevail.
The Pring court considered itself absolutely constrained by
first amendment considerations.19 5 By contrast, other courts have
recognized that these considerations are not absolute. In Bindrim
v. Mitchell," 8 a case mentioned by the Pring court,197 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals affirmed a damage award on behalf of a psy-
chologist who had been portrayed recognizably in a fictional ac-
count of his nude group therapy sessions. Plaintiff had permitted
the author of the story to attend his therapy sessions on the condi-
tion that she "not take photographs, write articles, or in any man-
ner disclose who has attended the workshop or what has tran-
spired." Plaintiff asserted that he was libeled in the piece by the
suggestion that he used obscene language and by inaccurate por-
trayals of what took place. Plaintiff obtained relief despite the
court's finding that he was a public figure and that the piece was
fictional.
supra note 187.
194. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 86-98.
196. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
197. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1132 (1983).
198. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979).
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The defendants in Bindrim argued that the fact that the book
was labeled a novel barred any claim that the writer or publisher
may have implied that the characters in the book were factual rep-
resentations of actual persons. 199 The court rejected that
argument:
That contention, thus broadly stated, is unsupported by the cases. The test is
whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that the
fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as
described . . . . Whether a reader, identifying plaintiff with the "Dr.
Herford" of the book, would regard the passages herein complained of as
mere fictional embroidering or as reporting actual language and conduct,
was for the jury. Its verdict adverse to the defendants cannot be overturned
by this court.20 0
Although the Pring court briefly mentioned the Bindrim deci-
sion,20 1 it failed to distinguish why the fiction could be submitted
to the jury in Bindrim but not in Pring.
Under the framework proposed by this Article, the Pring
court would have been able to consider the plaintiff's sex-based
civil rights and free speech interests in controlling the context in
which she was sexually portrayed. Those interests, coupled with
the privacy interests, could have counterbalanced the defendant's
free speech interests. Application of this standard could have al-
lowed the Pring court's sympathy to have had substantive meaning
for the plaintiff.
D. Group Vilification
The injury from sex-based group vilification has never been
properly recognized. Under the proposed framework, this right
would be balanced against other competing interests.
The Brooks court failed to recognize the full scope of the in-
jury to the plaintiff from the sex-based criticism.0 2 Recognition
that the publisher's reply constituted "group vilification" could
have permitted the plaintiff to recover damages. Other courts
have recognized this concept in the racial context. 2 3 For instance,
199. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
200. Id.
201. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1132 (1983).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
203. See generally Delgado, supra note 7.
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the Washington Supreme Court in Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp.204 found that a Mexican-American, who had been subjected
to a campaign of racial abuse by his fellow employees, had stated a
claim against his employer for the tort of outrage.
Richard Delgado, in a recent article, argues that an indepen-
dent tort action for racial insults is both permissible and neces-
sary.205 He first traces the psychological, sociological and political
effects of racial insults-arguing that racial insults are linked to
the denial of equal treatment.0 8 He then proposes that a plaintiff
be permitted to bring an action under the following standard:
"Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was
intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff
understood as intended to demean through reference to race; and
that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial insult. '20 7
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees208 suggests that the tort of outrage could be equally
applied to sexual insults that are intended to be demeaning. Ac-
cording to the Jaycees Court, the stigmatizing injury and denial of
equal opportunities "is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering
discrimination on the basis of sex as by those treated differently
because of their race.' '29
E. Private Individuals Portrayed in Advertising
Private individuals who are portrayed sexually in advertising
without their consent often prevail under existing law when the
courts recognize that the nonconsensual sexual portrayal is defam-
atory.210 The proposed framework would strengthen that result
by permitting plaintiffs to recover damages if they can show that a
consentless sexual portrayal has injured them by falsely suggesting
that they consented to the portrayal, even if they cannot meet the
traditional standards for defamation. Hence, Moore could have at-
tained relief without proving that the portrayal was defamatory.
204. 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (en banc).
205. Delgado, supra note 7.
206. Id. at 135-49.
207. Id. at 179.
208. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
209. Id. at 625. See generally Delgado, supra note 7.




Existing law has assisted private persons who have been por-
trayed sexually for commercial purposes and have not consented
to their portrayals. However, private individuals who have been
portrayed in either news stories or fiction, and public figures who
have been portrayed in any context, have not been able to obtain
relief for their nonconsensual sexual portrayals.
Many of these plaintiffs could have prevailed under a broader
interpretation of existing invasion of privacy law, as set forth in
the proposed framework. Ann-Margret and Cathy Davis could
have prevailed if the courts had not erroneously extended the ac-
tual malice standard to actions for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. When the heart of a plaintiff's action is that the
defendant portrayed her in an objectionable and highly private,
yet accurate context, courts should investigate whether the pub-
lisher intentionally invaded the plaintiff's privacy. The question of
whether the publisher displayed reckless disregard for the
truth-the appropriate inquiry under the actual malice stan-
dard-is irrelevant to an allegation of intentional infliction of
emotional distress for a consentless but accurate sexual portrayal.
Moreover, Cathy Davis could have prevailed if the court had
not erroneously applied the limited purpose public figure test.
The purpose of that test is to protect publishers who publish in-
formation about an individual relating to that person's status as a
public figure. Rather than assume that a person is a public figure
in all contexts, courts should use the limited purpose public figure
test to determine whether the challenged portrayal closely relates
to an individual's status as a public figure. A nude portrayal of a
public figure in a context only superficially resembling that per-
son's status as a public figure, should not be sufficient to meet the
standards of the limited purpose public figure test.
Ruby Clark could have prevailed if the district court had rec-
ognized that her portrayal as a prostitute was capable of convey-
ing an offensive message. Instead, she needed to endure more
than six years of litigation before persuading the court of appeals
to instruct the district court to consider her argument that the
broadcast was capable of that meaning.
Jane Doe could have prevailed if the court had recognized
that it was permitted to balance a plaintiff's privacy rights, free
speech rights, and sex-based civil rights against the publisher's
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first amendment rights. It did not have to rely on the media vol-
untarily conducting its own balancing test.
Kimerli Jayne Pring could have prevailed if the court had rec-
ognized that fictional portrayals are not absolutely protected
under the first amendment when the individual portrayed is rec-
ognizable. It failed to see that recognizable fictional portrayals can
be harmful.
Finally, Susan Brooks could have prevailed if the court had
recognized that nonsexual criticism does not necessarily "induce"
a sexual insult. It could have noted that criticism through group
vilification receives less first amendment protection than other
types of criticism.
The proposed framework strengthens the available relief. It
considers the civil rights to be free from both invasions of privacy
and sex-based invasions of privacy. When courts balance the com-
peting interests, individuals who allege both types of civil rights
infringements will have stronger claims than persons who only al-
lege invasions of privacy. An individual who is portrayed in the
context of a private person will have a stronger claim than an indi-
vidual who is portrayed in the context of a public person. The pro-
posed framework is more encompassing than the courts' interpre-
tations of the New York statute. It requires that an individual
consent to each context in which his or her portrayal is used and
explicitly covers both public and private individuals. It also sur-
vives anticipated first amendment challenges under the United
States Supreme Court's recent decisions in New York v. Ferber 11
and Roberts v. United States Jaycees.212
211. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
212. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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